The Regulatory Basis for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Japan
My article on unilateral refusals to deal appeared in Osaka Law Review vol. 70, no. 5, published on January 29.
To summarize it briefly, if somewhat roughly: the article argues that the basis for regulating unilateral, direct refusals to deal lies in a lack of economic rationality, explained by the concept of “predation” in the sense used by Bork and others, and that an assessment focusing on this point is essential.
Two points strike me as particularly important. First, the article tries to give a theoretical account of the concept of “artificiality” (jin’isei) invoked by Japan’s Supreme Court. Second, it identifies the difficulty of setting a baseline as a challenge in assessing the economic rationality of unilateral, direct refusals to deal.
I am sure it has many shortcomings, but I hope you enjoy reading it.
This post was translated from the Japanese original.